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Right of Privacy-DIRECT INJURY MUST BE SHOWN BEFORE A COURT MAY
GRANT RELIEF FROM GENERAL GOVERNMENTAL SURVEILLANCE-Laird v.
Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
The right of privacy is an aggregate of many separate rights, each of
which is guaranteed in the Bill of Rights.' Although the right of privacy
was not recognized per se at common law,2 today it is acknowledged by a
majority of jurisdictions as a separate actionable legal right.3
The concept underlying the right of privacy is one4 which has consis-
1. "Various guarantees create zones of privacy." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
484 (1965). Privacy is impliedly protected from governmental intervention by the first amend-
ment through the right of association, and the third amendment's prohibition against the
peacetime quartering of soldiers in private homes without the consent of the owner. The right
of the people to be secure from unreasonable searches of thir persons, houses, papers and
effects is explicitly affirmed by the fourth amendment, and "the Fifth Amendment in its Self-
Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may
not force him to surrender to his detriment." Id. The right of privacy is protected also by the
ninth amendment which shields other nonenumerated rights retained by the people from
possible implied denunciation. Id.
For a discussion of the right of privacy see A. WESTN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967); Ervin,
Privacy and The Constitution, 50 N.C.L. REV. 1016 (1972).
2. Warren and Brandeis were the first to theorize the right of privacy as a separate cause
of action which could be protected by the courts. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy,
4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890). ". . . [I]t is most often stated that this law review article served
as the catalyst in recognition of the right of privacy." Comment, Thoughts Concerning the
Status of the Right of Privacy in Texas, 23 BAYLOR L. REv. 117 (1971).
Prior to the Warren and Brandeis article, the courts did not recognize a separate actionable
right of privacy. Privacy was protected by other rights such as property and contract rights.
62 AM. JuR. 2d Privacy § 2 (1972). Before the Warren and Brandeis article, the courts
specifically addressing the right of privacy did so only in cases involving tortious factual
situations arising from the invasion of privacy by private individuals or concerns.
3. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 802 (4th ed. 1971). Prosser has determined that
the invasion of privacy is not one tort but four:
(1) wrongful appropriation, for the defendant's benefit or advantage, of the plaintiff's name
or likeness;
(2) wrongful intrusion upon the plaintiff's physical solitude or seclusion;
(3) wrongful public disclosure of private facts;
(4) wrongful publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye. Id. at 804,
807, 809, 812.
Protection from tortious invasion of a person's general right of privacy has been held to be
analogous to protection .of property and life, and is therefore left largely to the law of the
individual states. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967).
The Supreme Court in a number of criminal cases involving fourth amendment protection
against unreasonable search and seizure has indicated that the constitution sanctifies a right
of privacy. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961);
Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). In
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) and Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), the
Supreme Court endeavored to protect privacy as guaranteed by the fifth amendment.
4. See Doss & Doss, On Morals, Privacy, and the Constitution, 25 U. MIAMI L. REv. 395,
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tently evaded adequate definition. While a literal definition of "privacy"
requires the utmost secrecy in all aspects of one's life, a more rational
approach provides that "[p]rivacy is not simply an absence of informa-
tion about us in the minds of others; rather it is the control we have over
information about ourselves."' Thus, in order for privacy to be enjoyed,
and the right to be invoked, citizens must be able to regulate the access of
others to knowledge about their personal lives.'
In a modern technological environment, privacy is subjected to numer-
ous infringements.' Predominant among infringements upon one's right of
privacy are the intrusions occasioned by the general surveillance utilized
by law enforcement agencies and other governmental bodies to combat
potential criminal activity." The government has continuously asserted an
396 (1971) who contend that ". . . the concept of privacy arises from the proposition that
the reach of civil and criminal laws should not be co-extensive with moral laws; rather, there
should be a realm of individual thought and action-a zone of privacy-beyond the law."
5. Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 482 (1968).
6. Id.
7. It is compromised by the just exercise of rights by others, the politically sanctioned but
questionable exercise of rights by others, the uncondoned conduct of others which society is
unwilling or unable to control, and the obviously wrongful aggressions and invasions by
others. Id.
8. "General Surveillance" is governmental observation and recordation of the acts of pri-
vate citizens, who are not suspected of specific criminal activity, while engaged in their
everyday affairs.
As of the 1960's, the new surveillance technology is being used widely by government
agencies of all types and at every level of government, as well as by private agents for
a rapidly growing number of businesses, unions, private organizations, and individuals
in every section of the United States. Increasingly, permanent surveillance devices
have been installed in facilities used by employees or the public. While there are
defenses against "outside" surveillance, these are so costly and complex and demand
such constant vigilance that their use is feasible only where official or private matters
of the highest security are to be protected. . . . [S]cientific prospects for the next
decade indicate a continuing increase in the range and versatility of the listening and
watching devices, as well as the possibility of computer processing of recordings to
identify automatically the speakers or topics under surveillance. A. WESTIN, PRuVACY
AND FREEDOM, 365-66 (1967).
Computers and comprehensive data repositories make the information obtained by govern-
ment agencies instantaneously obtainable and widely distributable. The most comprehensive
of all data repositories is the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Identification Division. The
Identification Division employs 3,300 persons who maintain 200,000,000 sets of fingerprints.
Menard v.Mitchell, 328 F. Supp. 718, 721 (D.C. Cir. 1971). According to 28 U.S.C. 534(a)(2)
(1969), F.B.I. records are only allowed to be given to "authorized officials." However, a
regulation promulgated by the Attorney General greatly broadens the field of eligible recipi-
ents by providing that the director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall:
Conduct the acquisition, collection, exchange, classification, and preservation of
identification records, including personal fingerprints voluntarily submitted, on a mu-
tually beneficial basis, from law enforcement and other governmental agencies, rail-
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almost unlimited right to monitor the activities of citizens when its surveil-
lance does not involve wiretapping or any other clearly unconstitutional
intrusion.9 However, such unregulated general surveillance stands at odds
with the concept of privacy implicit in the constitution. Increasingly, the
courts are being summoned to determine whether or not privacy can be
protected from general governmental surveillance under existing law.'0
Thus far courts have not determined this issue because they have failed
to advance beyond the threshold question of injury.
In Laird v. Tatum," respondents alleged that they represented a class
whose rights were being invaded by the very existence of the Army's data-
gathering system and its surveillance of lawful and peaceful political activ-
ity. Respondents submitted that their exercise of constitutional rights had
been "chilled"' 2 by this surveillance and that they were entitled to declara-
tory and injunctive relief. The United States Supreme Court, in a five to
four decision, held that because the respondents failed to show concrete
evidence of direct harm or threat of direct injury in the future, they did
not present a justiciable controversy.' 3 "Allegations of a subjective 'chill'
are not an adequate substitute for a claim of specific present objective
harm or a threat of specific future harm. . . ."" The Court indicated that
road police, national banks, member banks of the Federal Reserve System, FDIC-
Reserve-Insured Banks, and banking institutions insured by the Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Corporation. . . .28 C.F.R. .§ 0.85(b) (1970).
Unfortunately, "[tihe overwhelming majority of F.B.I. records do not tell a complete
story." Hoover, The Confidential Nature of F.B.I. Reports, 8 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 4 (1956).
9. Hearings on Federal Data Banks, Computers and the Bill of Rights Before the Sub-
comm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
597 (1971) (statement by W.H. Rehnquist). Furthermore, the administration holds that in
order to insure that the government does not abuse its power to use surveillance, the people
of America must rely on the "self discipline . . . of the executive branch." Id. at 603.
10. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972); Finley v. Hampton, 473 F.2d 180 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
Donohoe v. Dulling, 330 F. Supp. 308 (E.D. Va. 1971), aff'd, 465 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1972);
But see Books, Inc. v. Leary, 291 F. Supp. 622 (S.D. N.Y. 1968).
11. 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
12. Recently the Supreme Court has held in numerous cases that violations of constitu-
tional rights may arise from the deterrent, or "chilling" effect of governmental regulations
and practices which do not otherwise constitute a direct curtailment of the exercise of first
amendment rights. E.g., Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1 (1971); Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
385 U.S. 589 (1967); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
13. In so doing, the Laird court relied on Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937) (per curiam
decision) which held:
It is an established principle that to entitle a private individual to invoke the judicial
power to determine the validity of executive or legislative action he must show that
he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury as the result
of that action and it is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to
all members of the public. Id. at 634.
14. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1972).
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had respondents presented "claims of judicially cognizable injury resulting
from military intrusion into the civilian sector .... ,,,5 a different result
could have been reached.,,,
Similarly, the plaintiffs in Donohoe v. Duling,7 allegedly representing a
class, sought a declaratory judgment as to their rights and injunctive relief
to prohibit the police in Richmond, Virginia, from photographing people
engaged in political demonstrations and from retaining such photo-
graphs."' The plaintiffs argued that the presence of police photographers
"had a 'chilling effect' upon their presence, as well as on others who may
have wished to participate."'' 9 The district court ruled that, because the
leaders of the groups staging the demonstrations had advised the news
media of the time and location of such demonstrations, they could not later
complain of the police photographing the activities." Additionally, the
court determined "that the practices of the Richmond police as heretofore
described are not only permissible and constitutional, but they are also
commendable and should be encouraged."'" The fourth circuit affirmed
Donohoe," reasoning that the appellants failed to show they had been
directly injured or "chilled" in their exercise of constitutional rights, and
thus lacked standing to maintain an action representing a class of people
who allegedly had been adversely affected in that manner.n
15. 408 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1972).
16. We, of course, intimate no view with respect to the propriety or desirability, from
a policy standpoint, of the challenged activities of the Department of the Army; our
conclusion is a narrow one, namely, that on this record respondents have not presented
a case for resolution by the courts. Id. at 15.
. . . [Flederal courts are fully empowered to consider claims of those asserting such
injury; there is nothing in our Nation's history or in this Court's decided cases, includ-
ing our holding today, that can properly be seen as giving any indication that actual
or threatened injury by reason of unlawful activities, of the military would go unnoticed
or unremedied. Id. at 16.
17. 330 F. Supp. 308 (E.D. Va. 1971).
18. The court found that "[iut has long been the policy in Richmond and other places
throughout the nation to photograph persons participating in vigils, demonstrations, protests
and other like activities whether peaceful or otherwise. Id. at 309.
19. Id. at 309-10.
20. They knew, in taking such action, that photographers would be present to take
pictures of the assembled group, especially the leaders. They knew, or could fairly
assume, that photographs taken by news and television media are readily available to
law enforcement authorities upon request or order of any court. They invited the
publicity and must stand the consequences. Id. at 310.
21. Id. at 311.
22. 465 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1972).
23. . . . [Tihere was a complete absence of testimony that any of the plaintiffs had
ever sustained any "specific present objective harm" or had ever been personally
restrained, or "chilled" in the exercise of his or her first amendment rights. . . . At
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In both Laird and Donohoe the courts failed to traverse the threshold
-question of the existence of direct injury, present or imminently future,
and thus were unable to determine the legality or illegality of the govern-
mental activity in controversy. Laird indicated that the lack of direct
injury to respondents resulted in an absence of justiciable controversy; and
Donohoe determined that the lack of direct injury to appellants left them
without a justiciable claim and thus deprived them of the ability to repre-
sent persons alleged to be harmed.
Dissenting in Laird,2A Justice Douglas argued that "[t]he claim that
respondents have no standing to challenge the Army's surveillance of them
and the other members of the class they seek to represent is too transparent
for serious argument." He further asserted that it is not necessary to wait
to bring suit until one's reputation is defamed or his job lost." "To with-
hold standing to sue until that time arrives would in practical effect immu-
nize from judicial scrutiny all surveillance activities, regardless of their
misuse and their deterrent effect. '2 7 Relying on Baker v. Carr,'2 Justice
Douglas reasoned that a litigant has standing to seek relief when he has
"alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult consti-
tutional questions. 2 9 Thus, he concluded, the controversy was real, tangi-
best, they asserted that they were "annoyed" or "felt uncomfortable" or "nerv-
ous".... [T]here is... nothing in this record to establish harm or injury actually
sustained by the plaintiffs themselves. Id. at 199.
Judge Winter in his dissent concluded that the plaintiffs had standing to sue and
that the police had no valid justification for intimidating all participants in any dem-
onstration in order to photograph the alleged leaders who were already well known to
police before the demonstration.
24. 408 U.S. 1 (1972) (Douglas, J. dissenting, with whom Marshall, J. concurs).
If Congress had passed a law authorizing the armed services to establish surveillance
over the civilian population, a most serious constitutional problem would be-presented.
There is, however, no law authorizing surveillance over civilians, which in this case the
Pentagon concededly had undertaken. The question is whether such authority may be
implied. One can search the Constitution in vain for any such authority. Id. at 16.
25. "The surveillance of the Army over the civilian sector-a part of society hitherto
immune from their control-is a serious charge." Id. at 24.
26. Id. at 26.
27. Id.
28. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
29. 408 U.S. 1, 26 (1972) quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) held that ". . . in terms of Article III limitations on
federal court jurisdiction, the question of standing is related only to whether the dispute
sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an adversary context and in a form historically
viewed as capable of judicial resolution. Id. at 101. The legal relations of the parties in
litigation must have adverse legal interests. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227,
240-41 (1937).
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ble, and therefore judiciallycognizable.
In their separate dissents, 3 Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall
also argued "that a justiciable controversy exists and that respondents
have stated a claim upon which relief could be granted."'3' Adopting the
argument of the court of appeals, 32 they concluded that "[b]ecause the
evil alleged in the Army intelligence system is that of overbreadth, i.e., the
collection of information not reasonably relevant to the Army's mission to
suppress civil disorder, and because there is no indication that a better
opportunity will later arise to test the constitutionality of the Army's ac-
tion, the issue can be considered justiciable at this time. '33
The Ex parte Levitt test 3 followed by the majority in Laird35 requires
that a citizen demonstrate that he has sustained or is in immediate danger
of sustaining a direct injury in order to establish a justiciable controversy.
However, the factual situation before the court in Levitt is signifi-
Justiciability is itself a concept of uncertain meaning and scope. Its reach is illus-
trated by the various grounds upon which questions sought to be adjudicated in federal
courts have been held not to be justicable. Thus, no justiciable controversy is presented
when the parties seek adjudication of only a political question, when the parties are
asking for an advisory opinion, when the question sought to be adjudicated has been
mooted by subsequent developments, and when there is no standing to maintain the
action. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968).
Standing is an aspect of justiciability and, as such, the problem of standing is
surrounded by the same complexities and vagaries that inhere in justiciability ...
The fundamental aspect of standing is that it focuses on the party seeking to get his
complaint before a federal court and not on the issue he wishes to have adjudicated.
Id. at 98-99.
30. 408 U.S. 1, 38 (1972).
31. Id.
32. 444 F.2d 947 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
33. 408 U.S. 1, 39 (1972) quoting Tatum v. Laird, 444 F.2d 947, 954-56 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
34. See note 13, supra.
35. 408 U.S. 1, 13 (1972). Although the court in Laird recognized that it had found "[iun
a number of cases that constitutional violations may arise from the deterrent, or 'chilling'
effect of governmental regulations that fall short of a direct prohibition against the exercise
of First Amendment rights," it distinguished these cases from Laird:
In none of these cases, . . . did the chilling effect arise merely from the individual's
knowledge that a government agency was engaged in certain activities or from the
individual's concomitant fear that, armed with the fruits of those activities, the agency
might in the future take some other and additional action detrimental to that individ-
ual. Rather, in each of these cases, the challenged exercise of governmental power was
regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature, and the complainant was either
presently or prospectively subject to the regulation, proscriptions, or compulsions that
he was challenging. Id. at 11.
The court concluded that although these decisions do "... recognize that governmental
action may be subject to constitutional challenge even though it has only an indirect effect
on the exercise of First Amendment rights," they have in no way eroded the principal ex-
pounded in L~vitt. Id. at 12, 13.
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cantly distinguishable from that presented by Laird and Donohoe. In
LEvitt, an interested citizen questioned the appointment of Mr. Justice
Black to the Supreme Court. "The motion papers disclose no interest upon
the part of the petitioner other than that of a citizen and member of the
bar of this Court. That was insufficient."36 Thus, the Court in Levitt did
not attempt to establish guidelines for determining what would be suffi-
cient to constitute a judicially cognizable injury. It is submitted that the
direct injury standard contemplated by the Levitt Court could possibly
include the injuries alleged in Laird and Donohoe. The inability to demon-
strate the manifest injury, as required by Laird and Donohoe, should not
prevent the exercise of judicial determination in such cases where there is
a strong possibility of future direct injury and where the proponents meet
the Baker v. Carr test of having a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy.
In cases involving general surveillance, the threshold of direct injury is
difficult to traverse. Because the product of the surveillance is customarily
in the possession of the surveillant, and its possible uses are known only
to him, injury may be impossible either to specify or prove." This does not
mean that injury is or will be nonexistent.
Under our present law, an anomalous situation has evolved. A person
totally innocent of crime may not invoke civil, criminal, or injunctive
remedies to protect himself from governmental invasion of his privacy by
general surveillance unless he has proof of tangible injury. But, a person
indicted for criminal activity may be able to invoke the exclusionary rule
to prevent information collected in violation of his constitutional rights
from being used against him."
Present encroachments on privacy inflicted by general governmental
surveillance represent so grave a danger to constitutional guarantees that
society should not be forced to remain without adequate protection while
courts capable of providing protection fail to do so. If the right of privacy
is to be enjoyed citizens must be able to regulate the access of others to
knowledge about their personal lives. In the area of electronic surveillance,
36. 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937).
37. Indeed, in Donohoe v. Duling, 330 F. Supp. 308, 312 (E.D. Va. 1971), the court denied
a motion by the plaintiff requesting production of the reports, notes, and files in the posses-
sion of the Richmond Bureau of Police pertaining to parades, demonstrations, meetings,
picketings, and vigils.
38. E.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966); United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251 (1966); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471
(1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960);
Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S. 346 (1957); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939);
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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Congress has attempted to limit the powers of government through proce-
dural regulations in Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act. 9 The courts have not determined the legality or illegality of
general governmental surveillance. Since the threshold question of direct
injury is likely to continue to artificially prevent litigants from reaching
the question of the legitimacy of such surveillance, similar guidelines and
remedies are currently overdue in the vast area of general governmental
surveillance .
H.S.L.
39. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1968). Title m "authorizes the use of electronic surveillance for
classes of crimes carefully specified in 18 U.S.C. § 2516." United States v. United States
District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 301, 302 (1972).
Such surveillance is subject to prior court order. Section 2518 sets forth the detailed
and particularized application necessary to obtain such an order as well as carefully
circumscribed conditions for its use. The Act represents a comprehensive attempt by
Congress to promote more effective control of crime while protecting the privacy of
individual thought and expression. Id. at 302.
See generally Christie, Government Surveillance and Individual Freedom: A Proposed
Statutory Response to Laird v. Tatum and the Broader Problem of Government Surveillance
of the Individual, 47 N.Y.U.L. REv. 871 (1972).
40. For a proposed statute see Christie, supra note 39.
